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Routing amid malicious attackers in multihop wireless networks with unreliable links is a challenging task. In this paper, we address
the fundamental problem of how to choose secure and reliable paths in such environments. We formulate the multipath routing
problem as optimization problems and propose algorithms with polynomial complexity to solve them. Game theory is employed
to solve and analyze the formulated multipath routing problem. We first propose the multipath routing solution minimizing
the worst-case security risk (i.e., the percentage of packets captured by attackers in the worst case). While the obtained solution
provides the most security routes, it may perform poorly given the unreliability of wireless links. Hence we then investigate the
multipath routing solution maximizing the worst-case packet delivery ratio. As a natural extension, to achieve a tradeoﬀ between
the routing security and performance, we derive the multipath routing protocol maximizing the worst-case packet delivery ratio
while limiting the worst-case security risk under given threshold. As another contribution, we establish the relationship between
the worst-case security risk and packet delivery ratio, which gives the theoretical limit on the security-performance tradeoﬀ of
node-disjoint multipath routing in multihop wireless networks.
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License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
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1. Introduction
It is widely recognized that the intrinsic nature of wireless
networks, such as the broadcast nature of the wireless
channel and the limited resources of network nodes, makes
them extremely attractive and vulnerable to attackers. Rout-
ing amid malicious attackers in such environments is a
challenging task. On one hand, the most secure route(s)
should be chosen such that the percentage of packet captured
by attackers is as small as possible. On the other hand, given
the unreliability of wireless links, the most reliable route(s)
should be selected such that the packet delivery ratio at
destination is as high as possible.
A natural approach is to use multiple paths to increase
the fault tolerance and the resilience to attackers. However,
how to choose the secure and reliable paths among expo-
nentially many candidates and how to allocate traﬃc among
them remain a diﬃcult but crucial problem.
1.1. Paper Overview. In this paper, we address the above
fundamental routing problem by focusing on two metrics:
route security and performance. We start with the single-
attacker case and extend our work to the multiple-attacker
case in Section 7.
We first study the multipath routing solution minimizing
the worst-case security risk; that is, the percentage of packets
captured by the attacker under the condition that the attacker
makes all its eﬀorts to maximize this percentage. We model
such multipath routing problem as a minimaximization
problem and formulate it as the maximum flow problem
in lossy networks based on which a routing algorithm with
polynomial time complexity being derived to solve it.
While the obtained solution provides the most security
routes, which is crucial for security sensitive applications,
performance is another important issue that definitively
cannot be ignored, especially in wireless networks with
unreliable links. To this end, we investigate the multipath
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routing solution maximizing the packet delivery ratio under
the condition that the attacker makes all its eﬀorts to
minimize this ratio. Noticing that solving this problem
requires exponential time complexity, we propose a heuristic
algorithm computing the optimal path set with polynomial
time complexity. In our study, we also apply game theory as a
systematic tool to solve and analyze the formulated multipath
routing problems.
Next, we extend our eﬀorts to study a natural problem:
how to achieve a tradeoﬀ between the route security and
performance. In this perspective, we derive the routing
solution maximizing the worst-case packet delivery ratio
while limiting the worst-case security risk under given
threshold. Furthermore, as a theoretical limit on the security-
performance tradeoﬀ of node-disjoint multipath routing,
we establish the relationship between the worst-case packet






where |P nd| is the maximum number of node-disjoint paths
in the network.
By simulation, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed multipath routing protocols. The results show that our
solutions show the best worst-case security and performance
among the simulated multipath routing protocols.
1.2. Background and Motivation. Multipath routing, as
mentioned above, is a promising way to improve route
reliability and security. Past work on multipath routing in
wireless networks mainly consists of evaluating the possible
paths via reputation metrics based on security or reliability
and distributing traﬃc among the routes with the highest
reputation ratings.
In [1], Papadimitratos et al. proposed an algorithm,
called Disjoint Path-set Selection Protocol (DPSP), to find
the maximum number of paths between a source and
destination with the highest reliability. DPSP tries to find
maximum number of node-disjoint paths based on the
reliability metric to improve the reliability of communication
by increasing the number of used paths.
In [2], Lou et al. proposed another solution for calculat-
ing the maximum number of the most secure paths called
Security Protocol for REliable dAta Delivery (SPREAD).
Their solution relies on previous knowledge of security level
of each node and calculates the link costs according to them.
It also exploits secret sharing to spread data over multiple
paths and proposes a security-optimized share allocation
method.
In [3], Papadimitratos and Haas proposed and analyzed
a routing protocol named Secure Message Transmission
Protocol (SMT) which improves security and reliability of
data transmission through diversity coding of data into
multiple symbols and transmitting each symbol over one
path by uniform loading. SMT employs a rating mechanism
to select the most reliable paths based on end-to-end
feedback.
Our work in this paper diﬀers with existing work in that
we base our work on the worst-case scenarios and provide
multipath routing solutions with guaranteed security and
performance properties. Our motivation is twofold: first,
in most of the proposed solutions, each path is rated
according to its past performance, and the paths with high
rate are selected to carry traﬃc. In such reputation-based
mechanism, the computation of the reputation rates is not
trivial at all; furthermore, this mechanism may fail to provide
good paths when facing strategic attackers. For example,
assume that three paths are available and each time the
two paths with the highest rates are selected. A strategic
attacker can itself do the same rating estimation and attack
the two paths with the highest rate. The problem is that
the rating mechanism implicitly assumes that there exists
correlation between the history and future performance.
With this correlation, one can predict the attacker’s action to
some extent. Unfortunately, a strategic attacker will certainly
not take predictable actions. Instead, in some cases it can
even take the advantage of the rating mechanism to cause
more severe damage to the networks. Motivated by the above
observation, we believe that it is crucial to study multi-
path routing solutions with guaranteed worst-case security
and performance properties, which is the focus of our
work.
In terms of the underlying methodology, our work is also
related to the min-max optimization and routing games [4–
7]. In fact, our work can be seen as the application of this
tools in hostile wireless networks with unreliable/lossy links
absent in classical context which pose significant diﬃculties
in solving the problem, as shown in later sections.
2. System Model and Assumptions
In our work, we consider a multihop wireless network,
modeled as a directed graph G = (V, E) with n nodes and
m edges. For the wireless links, we consider a model in which
any link is either “good” (i.e., error-free) or “bad” otherwise.
We refer to the probability that link e ∈ E is “good” as
the reliability factor of e, denoted by re. We assume that
diﬀerent links are independent. ( This assumption holds in
the case where diﬀerent wireless links use channels that are
well separated in time and frequency via the MAC protocol
or some channel coordination mechanism. The extension
of our analysis to alleviate this assumption to consider the
correlated-link case (the correlation between wireless links
highly depends on the underlying MAC protocol) is left for
future work.)
We consider a data session between a single source S and
destination T . S routes its packets along path Pi ∈ P (let
P be the set of paths between S and T) with probability
qi. An attacker M attacks the node v ∈ V \ {S,T} with
probability pv to disrupt the communication between S and
T. ( We assume that S and T are not attacked by M during
the communication. Multiple-attacker case is discussed in
Section 7.) If node v is attacked, all the traﬃc passing by it
is captured by M during the attack period.
In this paper, we assume that each node knows the link
reliability factors {re}. References [8, 9] address the issue of
how to estimate and collect this information. We also assume
that each node has the knowledge of network topology.
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 3
This information can be acquired from any secure link-state
routing protocol, for example, [10]. These assumptions allow
us to concentrate on the essential theoretical properties of
the multipath routing problem and the resulting solutions. In
the case where link reliability factors and network topology
change frequently, the update of the multipath set should be
performed periodically or triggered by the change.
3. Multipath Routing with Minimum
Worst-Case Security Risk
In this section, we study the multipath routing solution
minimizing the worst-case security risk. We quantify the
worst-case security risk by the percentage of packets captured
by the attackers under the condition that the attackers
make all their eﬀorts to maximize this percentage (or
equivalently, the probability that a packet is captured by
the attackers under the condition that the attackers make
all their eﬀorts to maximize this probability). We start with
the case of single attacker M. In such a routing problem,
the objective of S is to calculate q = {qi} to minimize
the maximum security risk caused by M. Mathematically,
the multipath routing problem can be formulated as the
















pv ≤ 1, pv ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ V
∑
P∈P
q(P) = 1, q(P) ≥ 0, ∀P ∈ P ,
(2)
where τ(P, v) = ∏e∈P,evre, ϕ(P, v) =
∏
b∈P,bv(1 −
pb). a  b denotes that packets encounter node/edge
a before node/edge b when routed along P. r =∑
v∈V[
∑
v∈P,P∈P q(P)τ(P, v)ϕ(P, v)]pv is the expected prob-
ability that the packet is captured by M. Let r′ =∑
v∈V[
∑
v∈P,P∈P q(P)τ(P, v)]pv. If M attacks at most one
node per path, then r = r′. In general case, it always holds
that r ≤ r′. Noticing that MP1 is a nonlinear optimization








which is a linear optimization problem. Later in Section 3.2
we will show that r∗ = (r′)∗.

















pv ≤ 1, pv ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ V.
(4)
Associating a dual variable y, we obtain the following
dual optimization problem:
min y
Subject to y ≥
∑
v∈P,P∈P
τ(P, v)q(P), ∀v ∈ V. (5)
Substituting this minimization problem in MP
′
1 leads to







τ(P, v)q(P) ≤ y, ∀v ∈ V,
∑
P∈P
q(P) = 1, q(P) ≥ 0, ∀P ∈ P .
(6)
The size of LP
′
1 grows with the number of possible paths
between S and T and can be exponentially large. For this
reason we reformulate LP
′
1 as the maximum flow problem in




1, we can interpret q(P) as a flow on P
and y as the capacity of node v. Thus the constraint∑
v∈P,P∈P τ(P, v)q(P) ≤ y restricts the flow on node v. The
constraint
∑
P∈P q(P) = 1 states that one unit of flow is sent
from S to T . Assume that the capacity of each node v in the
network is 1. LP
′
1 equals to determine the smallest scaling
factor y on the network nodes such that one unit of flow can
be sent from S to T . In this way LP
′
1 can be mapped to the
maximum flow problem.
Here we would like to emphasize that the maximum flow
problem in our context diﬀers from the classical maximum
flow problem due to the packet loss factor τ(P, v). Indeed our
problem can be seen as the maximum flow problem in lossy
networks [11]. Each link has unlimited capacity +∞, but has
a reliable factor re. If re = 1, for all e ∈ V, our problem
degenerates to the standard maximum flow problem with
node capacity constraint.
3.1. Solving the Multipath Routing Problem. We first give the
stretch of the solution.
(i) Perform node splitting to transform the maximum
flow problem with node capacity constraint into
the maximum flow problem with link capacity
constraint.
(ii) Calculate the maximum flow f ∗ in the transformed
network after the node splitting procedure. Decom-
pose the maximum flow into subflow on paths P1,
P2,. . ., Pl from S to T with flow fi on Pi, respectively.
(iii) S should route its packets along path Pi with proba-
bility qi = fi/ f ∗ to minimize the security risk. The
minimum security risk r∗ is 1/ f ∗.
(iv) Perform the inverse procedure of node splitting. Map
the paths and flows in transformed graph into the
correspondent paths and flows in the original graph.
In the following, we detail the core part of the solution.
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Figure 1: Node splitting.
3.1.1. Node Splitting. The objective of node splitting is to
transform the maximum flow problem with node capacity
constraint into the standard maximum flow problem with
link capacity constraint. The key idea is to replace a node
with capacity c with two virtual nodes with a link of capacity
c between them. The detailed transformation procedure is as
follows.
(i) Split each node v ∈ V of capacity cv into two virtual
nodes v1 and v2. Add a link (v1, v2) with the same
capacity cv and the reliable factor 1.
(ii) For each link (v, v′) ∈ E of reliability p, replace
(v, v′) by a link (v2, v′) with the same reliability p
and the capacity +∞. For each link (v′′, v) ∈ E of
reliability p, replace (v′′, v) by a link (v, v1) with the
same reliability p and the capacity +∞.
Figure 1 illustrates the node splitting procedure. After
the procedure, node v1 receives all the input flows of node
v; the output flows of node v are sent by the node v2; the
added virtual link (v1, v2) carries the flow from input to the
output which is restricted by its capacity cv. Let G′ denote the
resulting network after applying the node splitting process
on the original network G. It is clear that each flow in G is
one-to-one mapped into a flow with the same quantity in G′.
Hence it holds that f ∗ is the maximum flow in G if and only
if f ∗ is the maximum flow in G′.
3.1.2. Finding Maximum Flow. Our discussion in this sub-
section relies on the maximum flow problem in lossy net-
works. Given a lossy network, the maximum flow problem
is to determine the maximum flow that can be sent from
a source node S to a sink node T subject to the capacity
constraints (i.e., each link has flow bounded by the link
capacity) [11].
Such maximum flow problem in lossy networks is a
generalized case of the classical maximum flow problem. To
solve this generalized problem, we run the most improving
augmenting path algorithm described in [11], which gener-
alizes the maximum capacity augmenting path algorithm for
the traditional maximum flow problem [12].
In Algorithm 1, the augmenting path has a value,
defined as the maximum amount of flow that can reach
the sink, while respecting the capacity limits, by sending
excess from the first node of the path to the sink. A most
improving augmenting path is an augmenting path with the
highest value. The algorithm repeatedly sends flow along
the most improving augmenting paths. Since these may
not be the highest gain augmenting paths, this may creates
residual flow-generating cycles. After each augmentation,
the algorithm cancels all residual flow-generating cycles in
CancelCycles(), so that computing the next most improving
1: Input: transformed network G′
2: Output: maximum flow f ∗
3: repeat
4: f ← CancelCycles(G′)
5: f ∗ ← f ∗ + f
6: Find a most improving augmenting path P in G′
7: Augment flow along P and update f ∗
8: until f ∗ is maximum
Algorithm 1: Max-flow: most Improving Augmenting Path.
path can be done eﬃciently. Intuitively, canceling flow-
generating cycles can be interpreted as rerouting flow from
its current paths to the highest-gain paths.
An eﬃcient algorithm for computing a most improving
augmenting path based on Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm
is proposed in [12] with time complexity O(m+n logn) when
implemented using Fibonacci heaps. We refer readers to [11]
for detailed algorithm and [13] for a completed survey on the
generalized maximum flow problem in lossy networks.
3.2. A Game Theoretic Interpretation. In this subsection, to
gain a more in-depth insight of the internal structure of the
obtained multipath routing solution, we study the multipath
routing problem from a game theoretic perspective by
modelling it as a noncooperative game between S and
M, denoted as G1. The strategy of S and M is q and p,
respectively. The objective of S is to determine q to minimize
its utility function Us = r, which is the security risk. The
objective of M, on the other hand, is to determine p to
maximize its utility function Ua = r.
G1 is a classical two-person zero-sum game with finite
strategy set. Following [14, Proposition 33.1], a Nash equi-
librium (mixed strategy) is guaranteed to exist. Based on the
result on the two-person zero-sum game [14, Proposition
22.2], we have the following theorem on the NE (Nash
equilibrium) of the multipath routing game G1.


















Theorem 1 shows that the solution of MP1 is the most
secure routing strategy minimizing the security risk. The
minimized security risk from S’s point is, on the other hand,
the upper bound of the payoﬀ that M can get. Hence, at
the NE, the two players reach a compromise through self-
optimization such that neither has incentive to deviate.
We now investigate the attacker’s strategy at the NE. We
consider the maximum flow f ∗ on the lossy network G′
which is obtained from G applying the node splitting. Let f ∗e
be the flow of f ∗ on the edge e. It follows from [15] that
there exists a cut C separating S and T such that
∑
e∈S f ∗e =∑
e∈S Ce. In our case, C consists of a subset of virtual links
added in the node splitting process with capacity 1. This
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 5
can be shown by the fact that the capacity of all other links
is +∞. These virtual links correspond to a set of nodes in
the original network, denoted as VC . As a dual part of the
maximum flow problem, at the NE, M attacks every node
v ∈ VC with probability 1/|VC| where |VC| denotes the
cardinality of VC . At the NE, the probability that a packet
passes the node v ∈ VC is 1/ f ∗; thus the probability of the








which confirms the previous analytical results. Furthermore,
it follows that at such NE, M attacks at most one node per
path. This leads to r∗ = (r′)∗, which justifies our operation
of solving MP
′
1 instead of MP1.
3.3. Complexity Analysis. In the solution of the previous
multipath routing problem, the complexity of the node split-
ting and the inverse procedure is O(n). We now investigate
the complexity of Algorithm 1 in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let 0 be the smallest positive number describing
all possible values in Algorithm 1; Algorithm 1 terminates
within at most logm/(m−1)( f ∗/0) + 1 iterations, where n
denotes the largest integer not larger than n.
Proof. The key idea of the proof is to notice that the
maximum flow in lossy networks can be decomposed into
at most m augmenting paths. Algorithm 1 selects the path
that generates the maximum amount of excess at the sink.
Thus, each iteration captures at least a 1/m fraction of the
remaining flow. Please refer to appendix for the detail of the
proof.
Note that in Algorithm 1, the time complexity of the
CancelCycles subroutine is O(mn2 log(1/0)) and that of
finding the most augmenting path is O(m + n logn). Gen-
erally, 0 is suﬃciently small. The total time complexity of
the algorithm is thus O(mn2 log(1/0) log( f ∗/0)).
In reality, it is often more practical for S to find the
quasioptimal solution of MP1, that is, the flow f˜ ∗ =
(1 − ) f ∗ where  is suﬃciently small. In such cases, the
time complexity of finding f˜ ∗ is O(mn2 log(1/) log( f ∗/))
applying the proof of Theorem 2. As a result, the proposed
solution oﬀers the flexibility for the source node to balance
between the time complexity of the algorithm and the
optimality of the result by tuning the parameter .
3.4. Discussion. The multipath routing problem investigated
in this section is related to the work of inspection point
deployment in [16] and intrusion detection via sampling
in [17] which root from the drug interdiction problem.
Our work diﬀers from theirs in the following. Firstly, in
[16, 17], the strategy of the police and the service provider
is to inspect and sample the edges, while in our problem,
the attack is on the nodes, which is more eﬃcient from the
attacker’s point of view. Secondly, in [16, 17], the network is













adapted for wireless networks where packet loss and link
instability is one of the major concerns. Thirdly, since finding
the maximum flow in lossy networks is by nature much
more complex to solve than in classical lossless networks, we
choose a solution providing the flexibility for the source node
to balance between the time complexity of the algorithm and
the optimality of the result by tuning the parameter .
One limitation of the obtained multipath routing solu-
tion is that it minimizes the security risk by choosing
appropriate multipaths without taking into account the
performance of the selected path set. Figure 2 (the number
beside the edge is the reliability of the link) provides an
illustrative example. Based on the proposed solution, S
should select the path SAT and SBDT , but it is clear that
the path SCDT is more eﬃcient than SBDT . The problem
is that in previous solution, in some cases, the security is
obtained at the price of performance (characterized by the
packet delivery ratio). This limitation may pose problem
for the applications where the performance of the paths
is as important as the security or even more, such as ad
hoc networks for emergency rescue. In such scenarios, it is
more important for S to find the paths of which the packet
delivery ratio at T is maximized even at the presence of
M. This motivates us to investigate the multipath routing
solution maximizing the worst-case packet delivery ratio.
In Section 6, we extend our work to derive the multipath
routing solution to achieve a tradeoﬀ between route security
and performance.
4. Multipath Routing with Maximum
Worst-Case Packet Delivery Ratio
In this section, we study the multipath routing solution to
maximize the worst-case packet delivery ratio (or equiva-
lently, the probability that a packet arrives at T under the
condition that the attacker makes all its eﬀorts to minimize

















pv ≤ 1, pv ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ V,
∑
P∈P
q(P) = 1, q(P) ≥ 0, ∀P ∈ P ,
(9)
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where a = ∑P∈P q(P)τ(P,T)
∏
v∈P(1 − pv) is the expected
probability that a packet arrives at T .
4.1. Solving the Maximinimization Problem MP2. The maxi-
minimization problems such as MP2 are usually hard to solve
directly. In our study, in order to make the problem more
tractable, we apply game theory by modelling the multipath
routing problem MP2 as a game G2 by following the similar
way as in Section 3.2. What diﬀers here is that the objective
of S is to maximize its utility function defined as Us = a and
that the objective of M is to minimize Ua = a. Following the
same argument, the following theorem is immediate.



















Under the game theoretic formulation, solving MP2
consists of solving the multipath routing game G2, more
specifically, finding the NE of G2.
Before delving into the solution, we prove the following
useful theorems on the choice of strategy at the NE for the
players S and M.
Theorem 4. There exists an NE where the source node S
chooses only node-disjoint paths between S and T .
Proof. The proof consists of showing that if there exists an
NE where S routes its traﬃc on the paths with common
nodes, we can always construct an NE where the source node
S chooses only node-disjoint paths. Please refer to appendix
for the detailed proof.
In the following, we focus ourselves on finding the NE
with node-disjoint paths.
Theorem 5. At the NE with only node-disjoint paths, the
attacker M attacks at most one node per path.
Proof. If at such NE, M attacks node V1, . . . ,Vn on the same
path P with probability p1, . . . , pn, then the payoﬀ M gets on




) · · · (1− pn
)
. (11)
If M uses the same resource to attack only one node on
P, say V1, then the payoﬀ it gets on P is
U ′P = τ(P,T)
(
1− p1 − · · · − pn
)
< UP (12)
which implies that the strategy of attacking more than one
node on the same path cannot be an NE.
Now we are ready to solve the NE. We cite the following
well-known lemma [14] to conduct further analysis.
Lemma 1. Every action in the support of any player’s mixed
strategy NE yields that player the same payoﬀ.
Let P ∗ denote the multipath set chosen by S at the NE,
and qi the probability that S chooses path Pi ∈ P ∗ to route
its traﬃc at the NE, pi the probability that M attacks Pi at the
NE, τi = τ(Pi,T) =
∏









qiτi = qjτj .
∀Pi,Pj ∈ P, (13)
The packet delivery ratio a =∑Pi∈P∗ qiτi(1− pi). Notic-
ing
∑
Pi∈P∗ pi = 1, we have a = (|P ∗| − 1)/
∑
Pi∈P∗(1/τi),
where |P ∗| is the number of paths in P ∗. Noticing that a
is the packet delivery ratio that S wants to maximize, solving
the NE consists of finding the multipath set P ∗ such that
(|P ∗|−1)/∑Pi∈P∗(1/τi) is maximized. The maximized value
is the solution of MP2. The strategy of S and M at the NE can
be solved as follows.
(i) S’s strategy: route the packet along path Pi with
probability q∗i = 1/τi
∑
Pj∈P∗(1/τj).
(i) A’s strategy: attack path Pi with probability p∗i = 1−
((|P ∗| − 1)/τi
∑
Pj∈P∗(1/τj)).
It follows from p∗i ≤ 1, for allPi ∈ P ∗ that τi ≥ (|P ∗| −
1)/(
∑
Pj∈P∗(1/τj)). This implicates that M only focuses on
a subset of routes to minimize a. Interestingly, S also has
incentive to only route its packets on these paths even though
other paths are attack free due to the fact that the attack-free
paths are very poor in terms of performance. In summary,






|P ∗| − 1∑
Pi∈P∗(1/τi)






) ∀Pi ∈ P ∗.
(C1)
4.2. Heuristic Path Set Computation Algorithm. Although
solving MP
′
2 is more tractable than solving MP2, yet it
requires searching all possible node-disjoint paths between
S and T , which leads to exponential time complexity. In the
following, we propose a heuristic algorithm computing P ∗
with polynomial time complexity.
The goal of the heuristic algorithm is to find the optimal
multipath set P ∗ such that a = (|P ∗| − 1)/∑Pi∈P∗(1/τi)
is maximized. We first introduce the two intuitions of the
algorithm. Firstly, if we define τi as the reliability of path
Pi, then choosing more reliable paths leads to higher global
packet delivery ratio. Secondly, if we include more paths in
P ∗, then |P ∗| increases. However, the denominator of a
also increases, especially when τi is small. Thus, the key point
of our heuristic path set computation algorithm is to find
as many node-disjoint paths as possible while at the same
time as reliable as possible under the condition that the paths
in the multipath set satisfy the constraint (C1) such that the
global packet delivery ratio a is maximized.
In order to change the path reliability from a multi-
plicative to an additive form, each edge e ∈ E is assigned
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1: Input: network G
2: Output: multipath set P ∗ maximizing a = (|P ∗| − 1)/∑Pi∈P∗(1/τi)
3: Find the most reliable path P1 by Dijkstra algorithm, select P1; Set P ∗(1) = {P1}, k = 1, a = 0.
4: for each path Pi ∈ P ∗(k) do
5: Inverse the direction of each edge on Pi, and make its length negative of the original link cost.
6: Split each node v on Pi (except S and T) into two nodes v1 and v2; Add an edge (v2, v1) of cost 0. Replace each edge (v′, v) ∈ E
by the edge (v′, v1) without changing its reliability, replace each edge (v, v′′) ∈ E by the edge (v2, v′′) without changing
its reliability.
7: end for
8: Run the Dijkstra algorithm, find the most reliable path P′ with reliability τ′ in the transformed graph.
9: If τ′ < |P ∗(k)|/(1/τ′) +∑Pj∈P∗(k)(1/τj), halt by returning P ∗.
10: Transform back to the original graph; erase any interlacing edges; group the remaining edges to form the new path set P ∗(k + 1).
11: If a < (|P ∗(k + 1)| − 1)/∑Pi∈P∗(k+1)(1/τi), then P ∗ = P ∗(k + 1), a = (|P ∗(k + 1)| − 1)/
∑
Pi∈P∗(k+1)(1/τi).
12: If no more path can be found in the transformed graph, halt by returning P ∗, else k = k + 1 and go to 2.
Algorithm 2: Heuristic path set computation algorithm.
a weight we = − log pe. Then the conventional shortest path
algorithm such as Dijkstra algorithm can be applied to find
the most reliable path.
The heuristic path set computation algorithm, shown
as above, is based on the K-node-disjoint shortest path
algorithm [18]. The basic idea of the K-node-disjoint
shortest path algorithm is to add a path in each iteration
using graph transformation and link interlacing removal
such that the total cost is minimized. We refer readers to [18]
for a detailed description of the algorithm.
Algorithm 2 is a greedy approach finding the most
reliable path at each iteration. The iteration continues as long
as: (1) there exist paths in the transformed graph, implying
that there exist node-disjoint paths in the original graph; (2)
the constraint (C1) is satisfied. At the end of the algorithm,
the multipath set P ∗ maximizing a is returned. Once P ∗ is
found, S routes its traﬃc along Pi with probability q∗i .
One point concerning the correctness of the heuristic
algorithm is that if the most reliable path found in the
transformed graph satisfies the constraint (C1) (in the
transformed graph), then after erasing the interlacing edges,
all the paths in the newly formed multipath set P ∗(k + 1)
satisfy (C1). This can be shown by recursively applying the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. If P2 is the most reliable path in the transformed
graph that satisfies the constraint (C1) (in the transformed
graph), then after erasing an interlacing edge with another path
P1 ∈ P ∗, the resulting path P′1 and P′2 satisfy (C1).
Proof. Please refer to appendix for the detailed proof.
We conclude this subsection by addressing the com-
plexity of Algorithm 2. The worst-case complexity of the
heuristic algorithm is O(n3) in that there are at most ds node-
disjoint paths between S and T , where ds is the number of
outgoing edges from S. Since ds ≤ n−1, the algorithm iterates
n − 1 times in the worst case (S can reach all nodes in the
graph in one hop). In each iteration we run a minimum
weight node-disjoint paths algorithm whose complexity is
O(n2). The result is an overall worst-case complexity of
O(n3).
5. Achieving Security-Performance Tradeoff
In Sections 3 and 4, we focus on the multipath rout-
ing solution minimizing the worst-case security risk and
maximizing the worst-case packet delivery ratio. In fact,
security and performance are two important aspects, of
which neither should be ignored. Unfortunately, these two
aspects sometimes lead to divergent routing solutions. Hence
a natural next step is to investigate the multipath routing
solution for multihop wireless networks that achieves a
good tradeoﬀ between the route security and performance.
We formulated the routing problem in such context as the


























pv ≤ 1, pv ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ V,
∑
P∈P
q(P) = 1, q(P) ≥ 0, ∀P ∈ P .
(14)
In MP3, S wants to maximize the worst-case packet
delivery ratio in the presence of attacker M, while limiting
the worst-case security risk at most r0. Directly solving
MP3 needs an algorithm of exponential time complexity.
In this section, we propose a heuristic solution based
on Algorithm 2 to solve MP3. As discussed in Section 4,
maximizing the worst-case packet delivery ratio equals to
solve maxP∗(|P∗| − 1)/
∑
Pi∈P∗(1/τi) under the constraint
(C1). The routing strategy for S is to route the packets along
path Pi with probability q∗i = 1/τi
∑
Pj∈P∗(1/τj). In such
context, it is easy to compute the worst-case security risk as
r = maxPi∈P∗(rei1 /τi
∑
Pj∈P(1/τj)) where rei1 is the reliability
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of the first edge of Pi, since maxpminqr = minqmaxpr,









) , ∀Pi ∈ P ∗. (C2)
Our heuristic solution is extended form Algorithm 2. The
key idea is to include enough number of reliable paths in
P ∗ to limit the security risk. The intuition behind is that
distributing the traﬃc among more paths helps limit the
security risk. With this in mind, we modify Algorithm 2 such
that the iteration stops until the constraints (C1) and (C2)
are both satisfied or there is no more node-disjoint path
available. In the latter case, the heuristic algorithm fails to
find the multipath routing solution to MP3. This failure may
due to the fact that the constraint on the security risk is
too stringent such that no possible multipath set can meet
the constraint, or alternatively, the heuristic algorithm itself
cannot find the solution though it does exist. In such cases,
possible solutions include secret sharing and information
dispersion in which the key idea is to divide the packet to
N parts, and the recovery of the packet is possible only with
at least T parts. These techniques can further decrease the
security risk and improve the performance. We refer readers
to [3, 19] since they are out of the scope of our work.
6. Theoretical Security-Performance Limit
of Node-Disjoint Multipath Routing
In this section, we establish the relationship between the
worst-case packet delivery ratio a∗ and the worst-case
security risk r∗ in node-disjoint multipath routing. The
relationship gives one important security-performance limit
of the node-disjoint multipath routing with the presence
of an attacker in the sense that we cannot find better
routing solutions with node-disjoint paths whose security
and performance can go beyond the limit.
Let P nd be the node-disjoint multipath set selected by S






On the other hand, let q0k = 1/τk
∑
Pj∈P nd (1/Pj). We have∑
Pk∈P nd q
0
k = 1 =
∑
Pk∈P nd qk, where qk is the probability of
routing packets along Pk. From the Pigeon Hole Principle,



















where rem1 is the reliability of the first edge on Pm.
















where |P nd|max is the maximum number of node-disjoint
path between S and T .
As a limit of node-disjoint multipath routing, the above
relationship shows the intrinsic constraint of minimizing r
and maximizing a at the same time. More specifically, if
we want to limit the worst-case security risk as low as r, it
is impossible to achieve a > (|P nd|max − 1)r; if we want
to guarantee the worst-case packet delivery ratio as high as
a, then we should expect the worst-case security risk of at
least r/(|P nd|max − 1). Moreover, given the requirement on
the route security and performance, one can check if it is
realizable or too stringent by using the above formula before
searching for the routing solution.
7. Multipath Routing with Multiple Attackers
In this section, we extend our eﬀorts to investigate the case
where there are n (n > 1) attackers in the network.
7.1. Minimizing Worst-Case Security Risk. There are various
formulations of the multipath routing problem under n
attackers to minimize the worst-case security risk, among
which we are interested in two typical formulations. In the
first formulation, let ri be the probability that a packet is
captured by attacker i, and S wants to minimize
∑
ri. This
case can be regarded as the case where S plays the multipath
routing game G1 with each of the attackers. Hence, the
solution of MP1 can be applied here. The only diﬀerence is
that the resulting minimum worst-case security risk is nr∗.
However, this does not influence routing strategy of S; in
other words, no matter how many attackers are there, the
routing strategy of MP1 provides the most secure routing
strategy minimizing the worst-case security risk in this case.
In the second formulation, the security risk is defined
as the probability that a packet is captured by at least one
attacker. In this context, the attackers will arrange their
attacks such that no more than one attacker will attack the
same node simultaneously; that is, they try to coverage the
most nodes possible to maximize the probability of capturing
the packet. Similar as in Section 3.2, we can show that the
attackers attack at most one node per path to maximize the
security risk. For S, to minimize the worst-case security risk
















pv ≤ n, 0 ≤ pv ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ V,
∑
P∈P
q(P) = 1, q(P) ≥ 0, ∀P ∈ P ,
(18)
where pv is the probability that a node v is attacked by any of
the n attackers.
MP4 is a linear optimization problem and can be solved
by classical linear programming techniques. However, due to
additional constraints pv ≤ 1, MP4 cannot be transformed
into maximum flow problem in lossy networks as MP1 that
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can be solved in polynomial time. As a result, solving MP4
may require an algorithm with exponential time complexity.
In the following, we give the upper bound of the worst-
case security risk under n attackers. To this end, we relax the
constraint pv ≤ 1 and perform variable transformation by




















p′v ≤ 1, 0 ≤ p′v ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ V
∑
P∈P




4 is identical to MP
′
1 except for a constant coeﬃcient
n. It follows immediately that its solution is n/ f ∗ where
1/ f ∗ is the maximum flow in MP
′
1. Let r′ be the worst-case
security risk under n attackers; following the fact that MP
′
4 is
obtained by relaxing the constraint pv ≤ 1 in MP4, it holds
that r′ ≤ n/ f ∗. In summary, by increasing the number of
attackers from 1 to n, the worst-case security risk increases at
most n times.
7.2. Maximizing Worst-Case Packet Delivery Ratio. We con-
sider the multipath routing game between S and the attacker
side consisting of n attackers. S tries to maximize the packet
delivery ratio and the attacker side tries to minimize it. It
can be shown that at the NE of the game, no more than
one attacker attacks the same node at the same time. This
is because attacking the same node at the same time gives
the attacker side the same payoﬀ as the case where only one
attacker attacks the node, which gives the attacker side less
payoﬀ than the case where the attacker side arranges the
attack to cover the most number of nodes possible. With this
in mind, by conducting the similar analysis as in Section 4.1,




|P ∗| − n∑
Pi∈P∗(1/τi)






) ∀Pi ∈ P ∗,
(C3)
where P ∗ consists of node-disjoint paths. The extension of
Algorithm 2 to solve MP5 is straightforward.
We now investigate the case where S also wants to limit
the worst-case security risk as low as r0 at the same time,
as in Section 5. Recall that rei1 denotes the reliability of the
first edge of Pi, and we sort the path by rei1 /τi, that is,






achieved when the n attackers attack the n most profitable
paths. To limit the worst-case security risk, the constraint∑n
i=1(re1i /τi
∑
Pj∈P(1/τj)) ≤ r0 should be added to MP5.
Algorithm 2 can be extended in a similar way as Section 5
Table 1: Simulation parameters.
Simulation time 1000 s
Number of nodes 100, randomly distributed
Network dimension 1000 m× 1000 m
Transmission range 200 m
Node speed 4 m/s, Random waypoint model
Data traﬃc CBR 4 pkt/s 64 bytes per pkt
Table 2: Simulation results: single-attacker case.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
r ps r ps
MinSR 15.2% 54.2% 13.1% 50.3%
MaxDR 19.1% 62.2% 16.8% 59.0%
MaxDR-SR 15.8% 58.2% 15.3% 54.4%
SMT 32.3% 48.5% 39.8% 36.5%
DPSP 24.1% 49.7% 22.8% 45.3%
solves it. In the multiple-attacker case, if |P nd|max ≤ n,
the communication between S and T is paralyzed by the
attackers.
8. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of proposed
multipath routing solutions through simulation using Net-
work Simulator (NS 2). Table 1 shows the simulation setting.
The link reliability of each link is generated from a normal
distribution σ(0.7, 0.2) trunked in [0, 1] interval.
8.1. Single-Attacker Case. We start with single-attacker case.
Two scenarios are simulated: the attacker launches its attack
to maximize the packet capture probability (scenario 1) or
minimize the packet delivery ratio (scenario 2). In both
scenarios, we assume that the attacker knows the routing
strategy of S.
We compare our solutions with SMT [3] and DPSP [1].
To focus on the multipath routing solution itself and perform
a fair comparison, we do not implement the message
dispersion in SMT. Since SMT and DPSP do not specify how
to balance traﬃc among the paths, we let S chose randomly
in the multipath set when having a packet to send.
Let MinSR denote the multipath routing algorithm
minimizing the worst-case security risk, MaxDR denote
the heuristic multipath routing algorithm maximizing the
worst-case packet delivery ratio, and MaxDR-SR denote
the heuristic multipath routing algorithm maximizing the
worst-case packet delivery ratio while limiting the worst-case
security risk under certain threshold (the threshold is set to
16% in out simulation). In MinSR, to balance the complexity
of the algorithm and the solution optimality, we set  = 0.05.
Table 2 shows the simulation results.
The simulation results show that SMT performs poorly in
both scenarios. This is due to the fact that in our simulation,
diﬀerent from the scenarios simulated in literatures [3, 20],
we simulate the worst-case scenarios where the attacker















Figure 3: Multiple-attacker case: scenario 1.
launches its attack in the unpredictable way which is not
correlated with the history rating. In such context, the
attacker can actually take the advantage of the path rating
mechanism to cause more severe damage. DSDP performs
almost the same in two scenarios in that it selects the most
reliable multipath set without taking into consideration of
attackers. The resilience to attacks of DPSP is purely due to
its multipath nature.
For our solution MinSR, it achieves the minimum
security risk in scenario 2, which confirms the analytical
result in that the upper bound of the security risk r∗ is
achieved in scenario 1. However, the packet delivery ratio
in MinSR is less than that in MaxDR. This is due to the
limitation of MinSR discussed in Section 3.4. From the
simulation, we can see that the suboptimality of MinSR in
terms of performance can be rather important compared
to MaxDR, which achieves the best performance among
all the simulated multipath routing solutions. MaxDR-SR,
on the other hand, achieves a tradeoﬀ between the route
security and performance, which is shown by the simulation
results that MaxDR-SR lies between MinSR and MaxDR in
terms of route security and performance. Furthermore, we
observe the fact that the number of maximum node-disjoint
paths in our simulation is around 6. From this observation,
we can verify the relation between the route security and
performance using the formula derived in Section 6 on the
theoretical limit of node-disjoint multipath routing.
8.2. Multiple-Attacker Case. We then evaluate the perfor-
mance of MaxDR and MaxDR-SR (the security risk threshold
r0 is set to 0.55) in cooperative multiple-attacker case where
the attacker side arranges their attacks on a subset of paths
so as to maximize the security risk in scenario 1 and to
minimize the packet delivery ratio in scenario 2. Figures 3
and 4 plot a and r as a function of the number of attackers.
SMT is not plotted here since the worst-case packet delivery















Figure 4: Multiple-attacker case: scenario 2.
is not simulated here in that according to our analysis in
Section 7.1, the first formulation is simply the aggregated
case of the single-attacker case; in the second formulation, no
polynomial routing algorithm exists minimizing the worst-
case security risk.
The results show that the performance degrades signif-
icantly with the increase of the number of attackers. The
communication is almost paralyzed with 5 attackers. At
the presence of 6 attackers, MaxDR-SR cannot find routing
solution whose security risk is not more than 0.55. Once
again, our results seem very diﬀerent from those obtained
from literatures. This is because we focus on the worst-
case scenarios throughout this paper. Unlike the traditional
simulation where a percentage of nodes is assumed to be
compromised, we implement much more powerful attackers
with perfect knowledge of the network and the routing
strategies. These attackers are able to launch the most severe
attacks which are not predictable nor correlated in time or
space. In such context, our results reflect the lower bound
of performance of the simulated routing solutions. We argue
that maximizing this lower bound, as discussed in our
work, is of great importance since the attackers cannot be
underestimated in any case. Meanwhile, we can see from the
results that our solutions perform substantially better than
DPSP in terms of both route security and performance.
In summary, the simulations show that the proposed
multipath routing solutions achieve the design objective of
providing the best security and/or performance in the worst-
case scenarios.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we address the fundamental problem of how
to choose secure and reliable paths in wireless networks. We
formulate the multipath routing problem as optimization
problems and propose algorithms with polynomial com-
plexity to solve them. Three multipath routing solutions are





Figure 5: Two paths forms a cycle.
proposed: MinSR minimizes the worst-case security risk,
MaxDR maximizes the worst-case packet delivery ratio, and
MaxDR-SR achieves a tradeoﬀ between them by maximizing
the worst-case packet delivery ratio while limiting the worst-
case security risk under given threshold. We also establish
the relationship between the worst-case security risk and
packet delivery ratio, which gives the theoretical security-
performance limit of node-disjoint multipath routing.
The analytical and simulation results in the paper lead us
to the following conclusion.
(i) Solutions based on path rating which work well in
the presence of time or location correlated attacks
may fail to provide secure and reliable paths facing
strategic attackers with unpredictable attack patterns.
(ii) Two issues are crucial in multipath routing. Firstly,
both the security and performance should be taken
into account when choosing the optimal paths, as
in [2] and our work. Secondly, the traﬃc should
be balanced among paths such that they are equally
“attractive” to attackers.
(iii) Among the proposed multipath solutions, MaxDR-
SR achieves good security-performance tradeoﬀ by
choosing suﬃcient number of mutually disjoint
paths with high reliability and balancing the traﬃc
in the optimal way.
Appendix
A. Proof of Theorem 2
By [11, Corollary 2.3.4], the maximum flow in lossy networks
can be decomposed into at most m augmenting paths.
Algorithm 1 selects the path that generates the maximum
amount of excess at the sink. Thus, each iteration captures
at least a 1/m fraction of the remaining flow. Let fk be the
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Figure 6: P1, P2 shares the edge e.
Injecting fk−1, . . . , f2, f1 into fk, we have
fk ≥ fk−1 + 1
m
(













































































































Algorithm 1 terminates if f ∗ − [1 − ((m− 1)/m)k] f ∗ <
o, that is, k > logm/(m−1)( f
∗/0).
B. Proof of Theorem 4
We have shown that there exists at least one NE in G2. We
now show that if the NE consists of overlapped paths with
common nodes, we can construct another NE with node-
disjoint paths.
We first give some definitions. For two paths sharing
nodes A, B with (A,B) /= (S,T), let Q1 and Q2 be the node
sequence of the two paths between A and B. Q1,Q2 can
be empty, but they cannot both be empty. Let l(Q) denote
the number of nodes in the sequence Q, we call the node
sequence AQ1BQ2A a cycle, and define the diameter of the
cycle AQ1BQ2A as min{l(Q1), l(Q2)}.
Assume that at the NE, there exists paths with common
nodes. We now study the cycle containing S with the
common nodes S and V with the smallest diameter. Suppose
that this cycle is formed by paths P1 and P2 with the node
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sequence L1 ∈ P1 and L2 ∈ P2 between S and V , as shown in
Figure 5 . Without loss of generality, we assume that l(L1) ≤
l(L2). It follows that at the NE, any node Vn ∈ L1 does
not belong to the multipath set chosen by the source except
P1; otherwise we find a cycle with smaller diameter, which
contradicts our assumption. It then holds that, at the NE, the
attacker has no incentive to attack any nodes on L1 because if
it attacks any node on L1 with probability p, it gets less payoﬀ
if it uses the same resource attacking V . From the definition
of NE, routing the packets on L1 gives S the same payoﬀ as
routing them on L2. Hence, we can switch all the traﬃc from
L1 to L2 without changing the payoﬀ of S. Moreover, since
the attacker does not attack any node on L1 at the NE, this
operation does not change the payoﬀ of the attacker, either.
Therefore, it is easy to verify that the multipath set after the
above operation is also an NE of G2. However, the number of
cycles decreases by one. As a result, by recursively repeating
the above process, we can transfer any NE to an NE where the
number of cycles is 0. Such NE consists of only node-disjoint
paths between S and T .
C. Proof of Lemma 2
The lemma holds evidently if P2 does not intercross P1. In
the following we prove the case where P2 intercrosses with
P1. As illustrated in Figure 6 , P1 is composed of L11, e,L
2
1, and
P2 is composed of L12, e,L
2
2 before erasing the interlacing edge
e. Here L
j
i (i, j = 1, 2) denotes a sequence of edges. Since P2


















e∈Lji re (i, j =
1, 2). At this moment, P2 has not been added into P ∗(k) yet,
and so the numerator of the above inequality and that in step
7 in Algorithm 2 is |P ∗(k)|, not |P ∗(k)| − 1. Note that the
cost of e is− log(re) in P1 and log(re) in P2 in the transformed
graph.
Since the Dijkstra algorithm is applied on the graph with

































































































In the same way, we can show that τ′2 = r12 r21 ≥












satisfy (C1), which concludes our proof.
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